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ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
Matthew C. Daigle
ABSTRACT
The rapid evolution and implementation of technology in society
has resulted in the increasing use of data as evidence in court. While
the scope of discovery is limited by, among other things, the burden
imposed on the producing party, the sheer magnitude of electronic
evidence compared to its physical counterpart necessitates a different
framework for evaluating such a burden. Without limiting factors, the
discoverability of electronically stored information (ESI) exposes
producing parties to liability disproportionate to the value of a case.
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have evolved to address
the discovery of ESI, the Georgia Civil Practice Act has remained
largely stagnant, requiring judges to retrofit existing case law
governing physical evidence to include ESI. This Note examines
Georgia’s approach to the discovery of electronic evidence and
proposes changes to modernize the state’s approach to eDiscovery.
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INTRODUCTION
The epoch of big data and the utilization of emerging technologies
give rise to new litigation practices surrounding the discovery and
use of electronically stored information (ESI).1 Particularly in
Georgia, a rapidly evolving hub for technology and innovation, the
procedures governing the discovery of ESI struggle to keep up with
the developments.2 The current laws provide little distinction
between physical evidence and electronically stored data, leaving
parties at risk of unintended consequences where best practices
around these two types of evidence diverge. 3
Electronic discovery (eDiscovery), “[t]he process of identifying,
locating, preserving, collecting, preparing, reviewing, and producing
[ESI] in the context of the legal process,” began as a nuanced aspect
of complex litigation surrounding large corporations with massive
amounts of data but is slowly making its way into smaller cases
across the judicial system. 4 These changes in technology and its use

1. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining the
impact of expanded data storage on discovery); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Rule 34 and Rule 45
“Possession, Custody, or Control,” 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 467, 520 (2016) [hereinafter The Sedona
Conf., Commentary on Rule 34 & Rule 45]; The Sedona Conf., Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital
Information Management (Fourth Edition), 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 305, 311 (2014) [hereinafter The
Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Glossary] (defining “Big Data” as “[e]normous volumes of data,
often distributed and loosely structured, that may be challenging to process with traditional technology
solutions”).
2. H.B. 1017, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016); Kevin Bradberry, Electronic Discovery
in Georgia: Bringing the State out of the Typewriter Age, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 551, 574 (2012); Allen
N. Trask III, IHeadache: The Incorporation of Metadata into Discovery in Litigation and Its Impact on
You, WARD & SMITH P.A. (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/the-incorporation-ofmetadata-into-discovery-in-litigation [https://perma.cc/A33C-URQC].
3. Glispie v. State, 779 S.E.2d 767, 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that Georgia law has no
special rules differentiating physical and electronic evidence), vacated, 801 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App.
2017). Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (establishing a uniform scope and procedure
for the discovery of all evidence), with FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2) (providing guidance specifically
differentiating ESI from physical evidence).
4. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 1, at 323; see also The Sedona
Conf., The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for
Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 28 (2018) [hereinafter The Sedona
Conf., The Sedona Principles].

Published by Reading Room, 2021

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 9

606

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

in court implicate ethical obligations for attorneys who are required
to zealously advocate for their clients.5
Data and its corresponding metadata provide searchable
information that enable a party to learn more about electronic files
and their origins.6 Metadata, data about data, include descriptive,
structural, administrative, or reference data relating to a particular
file—information that may be useful in pending litigation. 7 For
example, the metadata for an image file might include the time the
photo was taken, the device it was taken on, and, in some cases, the
GPS location where the photo was taken.8 But failure to properly
preserve and collect this kind of digital evidence to avoid spoliation
can impair, if not eliminate, its utility.9 The Sedona Conference—a
research group comprised of practicing lawyers from both the
plaintiffs’ and defense bar, judges, and academics seeking to advance
legal study surrounding litigation and technology—defines spoliation

5. Tyler
D.
Trew,
Ethical
Obligations
in
Electronic
Discovery,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/professional-liability/practice/2018/ethicalobligations-in-electronic-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/PVB6-AEHS]. In October of 2019, the State Bar
of Georgia proposed an amendment to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to expand a lawyer’s
obligation of competence to include “the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” Id.;
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, SEDONA CONF. WORKING GRP. SERIES,
https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%2520Sedona%2520Conference%25
20Cooperation%2520Proclamation_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML4Q-78UC]; State Bar of Ga., Bd. of
Governors,
Meeting
Minutes
(Oct.
19,
2019,
9:00
AM),
https://www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/boardofgovernors/upload/BG10-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NJ8P-D7GU]; STATE BAR OF GA., BOG BOARD BOOK: 2019 FALL MEETING 27
(2019); Bob Ambrogi, Georgia Moves Closer to Adopting Duty of Technology Competence, LAWSITES
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/11/georgia-moves-closer-to-adopting-duty-oftechnology-competence.html [https://perma.cc/5NTN-EA2H].
6. See Burkhard Schafer & Stephen Mason, The Characteristics of Electronic Evidence, in
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 18, 27 (Stephen Mason & Daniel Seng eds., 4th ed. 2017); Trask, supra note 2.
See generally The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Ethics & Metadata, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 169 (2013)
[hereinafter The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Ethics].
7. Metadata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Secondary data that organize, manage,
and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data. Metadata are evaluated when conducting and
responding to electronic discovery. If privileged documents or final versions of computer files may
contain metadata, they might be ‘scrubbed’ before release.”); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Ethics,
supra note 6, at 173.
8. What Is Photo Metadata?, INT’L PRESS TELECOMMS. COUNCIL, https://iptc.org/standards/photometadata/photo-metadata/ [https://perma.cc/DB49-NNK9].
9. Alexandra Marie Reynolds, Spoliating the Adverse Inference Instruction: The Impact of the 2015
Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), 51 GA. L. REV. 917, 919 (2017).
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as “the destruction of records or properties, such as metadata, that
may be relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation, government
investigation or audit.”10
This Note evaluates the state of eDiscovery in Georgia in
comparison to federal law on the subject. Part I examines the current
body of federal law surrounding eDiscovery. Part II analyzes the
application and implementation of Georgia’s standards in court,
addresses significant differences between state and federal laws, and
identifies current barriers to the advancement and expansion of the
law. Part III proposes alterations to Title 9 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (Code) that would modernize Georgia’s rules of
civil practice in the age of big data.
I. BACKGROUND
EDiscovery, as a body of evidentiary case law distinct from that
controlling physical evidence, emerged with the new millennium and
evolved over the subsequent decade. 11 The 2006 and 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) further
shaped the discovery of ESI in the federal court system by codifying
rules that distinguish data from other forms of evidence.12 The
amendments impacted the “scope, speed and specificity” of a party’s
obligations in discovery, particularly by establishing guidance for
proportionality and preservation standards. 13

10. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 1, at 356.
11. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4.
12. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., U.S. SUP. CT., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 4 (2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UYH4-SG6Z]; Brisa Izaguirre Wolfe & Amy D. Fitts, Amending Electronic Discovery
Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, A.B.A. (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercialbusiness/practice/2015/amending-electronic-discovery-under-new-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure/
[https://perma.cc/7YGZ-YDDC].
13. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 6; E-Discovery Update: Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
Amendments
Go
into
Effect,
MCGUIREWOODS
(Dec.
1,
2015),
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2015/12/E-Discovery-Update
[https://perma.cc/MF6B-XWU3].
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A. Proportionality Under Rule 26(b)
An overarching principle of proportionality guides the discovery of
evidence; however, the sheer magnitude of existing data underscores
the particularly important role in its application to ESI.14 Rule
26(b)(1) balances the burdens of production with the benefits the
evidence would provide at trial. 15 The proportionality standard of
Rule 26(b) governs both the extent of the evidence that a party must
preserve and the scope of production. 16
1. Duty to Preserve
The duty to preserve evidence arises from a common-law duty,
supplemented by the propagation of the FRCP. 17 Though Rule 26(b)
limits the scope of discovery, it creates an affirmative obligation to
preserve evidence relevant either to pending litigation or a reasonably
foreseeable future lawsuit.18 Producing parties need not preserve
every document that may be discoverable; rather, they must show a
good faith effort relative to the magnitude of the case at hand. 19
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 135; The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality in
Electronic Discovery, 18 SEDONA CONF. J. 143, 148 (2017) [hereinafter The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Proportionality]. Though 26(b) has included proportionality language since 1983, the
advisory committee notes that both courts and litigants must cooperate to reduce the burden and cost of
discovery arising from large volumes of ESI. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment. See generally George R.S. Weir & Stephen Mason, The Sources of Electronic Evidence, in
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 1.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 5–9; The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 65.
16. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 93. See generally The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Legal Holds, Second Edition: The Trigger & The Process, 20 SEDONA CONF. J. 341,
349 (2019) [hereinafter The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Legal Holds]; Samantha V. Ettari,
Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation Under FRCP 37(e): Triggers and Limits, 2017 PRAC. L.J.: LITIG.
30, 30 (2017).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(establishing that “[t]he obligation to preserve evidence arises when [a] party has notice that the
evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant
to future litigation” (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001))); The
Sedona Conf., Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 354.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
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Compliance with the preservation obligation requires a determination
of when the duty to preserve took effect and of the scope of evidence
it may cover.20
Most often, notice of a lawsuit triggers a party’s preservation
obligation.21 However, the duty arises “not only during litigation but
extends” to the period before litigation when a party should
reasonably know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated
litigation.22 As such, a party’s reasonable expectation of a pending
lawsuit triggers a producing party’s common-law obligation to
refrain from the destruction of relevant evidence and affirmative
statutory obligation to preserve information and data that may be
sought in litigation.23
Must a producing party perfectly preserve all data? Once pending
litigation triggers the preservation obligation, a party must preserve
that which is reasonable and proportionate in light of litigation. 24 The
2015 amendments narrowed the interpretation of “relevance” by
removing key phrases from the text of the rule that otherwise allowed

Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 352; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra
note 4, at 93.
20. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 93 (“The preservation analysis
includes two aspects: When the duty arises, and the scope of ESI that should be preserved.”).
21. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620–21 (D. Colo. 2007)
(“To ensure that the expansive discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) does not become a futile exercise,
putative litigants have a duty to preserve documents that may be relevant to pending or imminent
litigation. . . . In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.”).
22. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001); Henkel Corp. v. Polyglass
USA, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 454, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Legal Holds,
supra note 17, at 354.
23. Bouchard v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, No. 15 Civ. 5920, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143236, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (defining “pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation” as the initial trigger of
the producing party’s duty to preserve); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 93.
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). Rule 26(b)(1) states:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery
need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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discovery of information related to “the subject matter involved in
the action” and that which appears “reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.”25 In the context of ESI, the
language intended to mollify concerns of discovery abuse
surrounding high-volume data by curtailing the scope of what a party
can request.26
2. Reasonable Preservation Measures
Recognizing the near impossibility of perfect preservation, the law
only requires a preserving party demonstrate good-faith, reasonable
steps to preserve ESI.27 Reasonable preservation measures balance an
entity’s duty to preserve with its need to minimize disruption and
continue operating.28 Practices such as identifying relevant
custodians and implementing legal holds tend to weigh in favor of a
good faith determination, though the final determination depends on
the specific facts. 29
3. Proportionality in Production
The proportionality standard extends to the production of ESI by
limiting the expenses incurred by the producing party and narrowing
the scope of what must be produced to the requesting party and
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 356 n.27.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 350–51; The Sedona Conf., Commentary on
Proportionality, supra note 14, at 150.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 351; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra
note 4, at 60–61.
28. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 95.
29. The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 17, at 357; The Sedona Principles,
supra note 4, at 104; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 1, at 336 (“A
legal hold is a communication issued as a result of current or reasonably anticipated litigation, audit,
government investigation or other such matter that suspends the normal disposition or processing of
records.”). These holds may address retention procedures affecting both accessible data and data that
may not otherwise be reasonably accessible by the custodian. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona
Conference Glossary, supra note 1, at 336.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/9

8

Daigle: Georgia’s Approach to Proportionality for ESI

2021]

GEORGIA’S APPROACH TO PROPORTIONALITY FOR ESI

611

how.30 Though preservation and production costs generally remain
the expense of the producing party, Rule 26 provides an avenue for
allocating these expenses where the producing party is
disproportionately affected.31 Discoverable documents need only be
produced in one form, generally the form in which they are kept
during the course of business.32 Where the ordinary form may not be
usable by the requesting party, producing parties are best equipped to
identify the optimal form of production. 33
B. Preservation Sanctions: Addressing Spoliation Under Rule 37(e)
The newly-revised Rule 37(e) indicates a complete change in the
federal approach to a party’s failure to preserve ESI.34 These
revisions not only reinforce the proportionality and reasonableness
standards of Rule 26, but they also necessitate their application in
achieving a just and equitable resolution. 35 Rule 37(e) lays out a
three-step analysis in determining a party’s responsibility for the loss

30. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party
need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”); see also CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra
note 12, at 7.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person from . . . undue burden or expense, including . . . specifying terms, including time and place or
the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery . . . .”); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona
Principles, supra note 4, at 188 (providing six proportionality factors useful in determining cost
allocation). But see The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 189 (“The cost of
preservation should be allocated only in extraordinary circumstances.”). However, the comments make
it clear that these cost-shifting measures are not supposed to open the floodgates to disproportionate
discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) (“A party need not produce the same electronically stored
information in more than one form.”); Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (“A party or anticipated party must
retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence at the time the duty to
preserve attaches . . . .”); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 184.
33. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 118.
34. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (providing remedial measures for parties affected by a party’s
“Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (2006) (repealed
2015) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a
party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note
to 2015 amendment.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 148–50.
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of data and the extent to which it may face consequences. 36 In
evaluating the most appropriate course of action, the court must
consider whether reasonable steps were taken to preserve the
evidence, the prejudice experienced by the non-producing party, and
whether the producing party acted with the intent to deprive another
party of the information during litigation. 37 Such action might include
a measure to cure judicial prejudice, or it may take a stronger
approach by imposing sanctions.38
1. Were Reasonable Steps Taken to Preserve ESI?
The first inquiry requires a determination of whether the producing
party demonstrated reasonable preservation efforts.39 Under the
proportionality in preservation guidelines, sanctions are not
appropriate where a court finds that a party took reasonable steps to
preserve electronic evidence. 40 However, where a court finds that a
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). Remedies include curative measures that only aim to cure the prejudice to
the requesting party and more severe sanctions meant to “deter failures to preserve electronically stored
information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194–97.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193 (“The
breach of a duty to preserve electronically stored information may be addressed by remedial measures,
sanctions, or both: remedial measures are appropriate to cure prejudice; sanctions are appropriate only if
a party acted with intent to deprive another party of the use of relevant electronically stored
information.”). Curative measures seek only to ameliorate prejudice resulting from lost evidence; they
may include case-altering sanctions (such as preclusion of evidence, an adverse inference, or dismissal),
repayment of costs incurred by the requesting party, or both. Compare Snider v. Danfoss, No.
15-CV-4748, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107591, at *19 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2017) (finding curative measures
unnecessary where the producing party’s failure to preserve did not prejudice the requesting party), with
Cat3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (ordering the producing
party to reimburse the requesting party’s expenses to address economic prejudice and precluding the
producing party’s use of spoliated e-mails as evidence). Courts will impose judicial sanctions upon a
finding that the producing party acted with an intent to deprive the requesting party of evidence. GN
Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. 12-1318, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93299, at *48–49 (D. Del. July
12, 2016) (ordering $3,000,000 in punitive sanctions where the requesting party showed a pattern of bad
faith by the producing party by instructing its employees to delete emails to deprive the requesting party
of the evidence in discovery).
39. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendments (“The rule applies only if the
information was lost because the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the information.”);
Alan Klein & Kimberly G. Lippman, Spoliation of Electronic Information Under Amended Federal
Rule 37(e), LAW.COM: THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 7, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202778281178/spoliation-of-electronic-information-
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party failed to meet the reasonableness standard of the preservation
obligation, it may take action against the spoliating party. 41
2. Was the Non-Producing Party Prejudiced by the Loss of
Information?
Where a loss of information exposes a litigant to prejudice, the
court may take the necessary steps to restore the requesting party to
the position it would have been in had the ESI been preserved. 42 A
party experiences prejudice where the lost ESI cannot be replaced or
restored.43 The imposition of curative measures relies on judicial
discretion to determine a fair remedy.44 The rule provides almost no
guidance for such cures, allowing courts to make determinations
based on the specific facts of the case. 45 The extent to which a court
may impose curative measures is limited to only “measures no
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”46

under-amended-federal-rule-37e/.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (allowing judicial sanction where “electronically stored information that
should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery”);
The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1) (“[T]he court upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the
information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice . . . .”); The Sedona
Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194.
43. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194–95. Where ESI can be
reproduced or replaced without impacting the requesting party, a finding of prejudice is inappropriate.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Klein & Lippman, supra note 40.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“Much is entrusted to the
court’s discretion.”).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. Rule 37 does not establish
which party bears the burden of proving prejudice. Id.; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra
note 4, at 195.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). Curative measures include “forbidding the party that failed to preserve
information from putting on certain evidence, permitting the parties to present evidence and argument to
the jury regarding the loss of information, or giving the jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of
such evidence or argument.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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3. Did the Producing Party Intend to Deprive a Party of the
Information in Litigation?
In determining the necessity of sanctions, courts must evaluate
whether the spoliating party acted in bad faith. 47 A determination of
bad faith requires a finding that the producing party acted
intentionally to “impair the ability of the potential [litigant].”48 The
“intent to deprive” standard creates a uniform test, ameliorating splits
across federal circuits.49
Where the court finds that a party acted in bad faith or showed an
intent to deprive the requesting party of discovery, it may authorize
sanctions in the form of an adverse instruction to the jury.50 Such an
instruction allows (or requires) that a jury presume that missing ESI
is unfavorable to the spoliating party. 51 This test for an
adverse-inference instruction consists of three elements: a duty to

47. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 196–97.
48. Micron Tech., Inc., v. Rambus Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 315 (D. Del. 2013); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193 n.158.
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; GN Netcom, Inc. v.
Plantronics, Inc., No. 12-1318, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93299, at *17 (D. Del. July 12, 2016) (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B)); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193; see also Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al.,
Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 811–14 (2010). An example
of the adverse instruction offered by the Zubulake court follows:
You have heard that UBS failed to produce some of the e-mails sent or received by
UBS personnel in August and September 2001. Plaintiff has argued that this evidence
was in defendants’ control and would have proven facts material to the matter in
controversy.
If you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, and that the evidence
was within its control, and that the evidence would have been material in deciding
facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS.
In deciding whether to draw this inference, you should consider whether the
evidence not produced would merely have duplicated other evidence already before
you. You may also consider whether you are satisfied that UBS’s failure to produce
this information was reasonable. Again, any inference you decide to draw should be
based on all of the facts and circumstances in this case.
Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 439–40.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he court . . . only upon finding that the party acted with the
intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation may . . . instruct the jury that it
may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party.”).
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preserve, a culpable state of mind, and the destruction of relevant
evidence.52 An actor with a culpable state of mind has demonstrated
an active purpose of destroying information that could otherwise be
used unfavorably.53 A showing of gross negligence will generally be
insufficient for an adverse inference. 54 However, a demonstration of
an intentional or willful act of destruction by the producing party will
satisfy both the culpability and relevance elements, resulting in
case-altering sanctions even where the deliberate act of destruction
was unsuccessful.55 Additionally, relevance “encompasses not only
the ordinary meaning of the term, but also that the destroyed
evidence would have been favorable to the movant.”56

52. Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 430. The test requires:
(1) [T]hat the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it
at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a “culpable state
of mind”; and (3) that the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s claim or
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim
or defense.
Id. (quoting Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001), superseded by rule, FED.
R. CIV. P. 37(e), as recognized in Szewczyk v. Saakian, 774 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2019)).
53. Micron Tech., 917 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (“To make a determination of bad faith, the court must find
that the spoliating party ‘intended to impair the ability of the potential defendant to defend itself.’”
(quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1994))); see also GN Netcom,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93299, at *25–26 (finding bad-faith intent where a senior executive took steps to
deprive the requesting party of discovery by deleting information and instructing subordinates to delete
information).
54. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that no adverse inference
should arise where the destruction of a document resulted from mere negligence because only bad faith
would support an “inference of consciousness of a seek case”); Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 431 (“[O]nly in
the case of willful spoliation does the degree of culpability give rise to a presumption of the relevance of
the documents destroyed.”); St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., No. 09-354, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119216, at *15 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2014) (finding no bad faith where conduct consists
of “inadvertence, negligence, inexplicable foolishness, or part of the normal activities of business or
daily living” (quoting Bozic v. City of Washington, 912 F. Supp. 2d 257, 270 (W.D. Pa. 2012))).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at
431 (“When evidence is destroyed in bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is
sufficient to demonstrate relevance. By contrast, when the destruction is negligent, relevance must be
proven by the party seeking the sanctions.”).
56. Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 431.
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II. ANALYSIS
The rules of discovery found in the Georgia Civil Practice Act
(CPA) provide no differentiation between the treatment of physical
and electronic evidence in discovery. 57 As such, Georgia courts
address eDiscovery issues on a case-by-case basis, squeezing them
into the existing framework governing physical evidence. 58 Because
Georgia appellate courts have long showed substantial deference to a
trial court’s discovery decisions, the few cases that actually receive
appellate attention significantly shape the state’s precedential
jurisprudence.59 Whether intentionally or otherwise, as Georgia
courts try to stretch discovery jurisprudence to also encompass ESI,
they risk application of unrealistic standards to big data, increasing
the relative simplicity of spoliation. 60
A. Comparison of the Georgia State and Federal Rules
At the time of its passing, the CPA Rules of Civil Procedure were
“substantially identical with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”
going as far as adopting a corresponding numbering system for the
Act’s structure in contrast to the Code’s usual schema.61 Courts

57. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-26, -34, -37, -54 (2015 & Supp. 2020); Bradberry, supra note 2, at 575.
58. See, e.g., AMLI Residential Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 153–54 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) (“Where a party has destroyed or significantly altered evidence that is material to the litigation,
the trial court has wide discretion to fashion sanctions on a case-by-case basis.” (quoting Bouvé &
Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 618 S.E.2d 650, 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005))); see also Hull v. WTI, Inc., 744 S.E.2d
825, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (reasoning that a judge should determine sanctions based on the present
case’s facts and similar cases’ discovery treatment); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Hartry, 729 S.E.2d 656, 658 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2012); Demido v. Wilson, 582 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (reasoning that the
plaintiff failed in demonstrating how inspecting the defendant’s servers would support his claims).
59. Howard v. Alegria, 739 S.E.2d 95, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Hartry, 729 S.E.2d at 658
(“Historically it has been the policy of Georgia appellate courts not to interfere with the trial judge’s
broad discretion granted to him under the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act.” (quoting
Vaughn & Co. v. Saul, 237 S.E.2d 622, 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977))); Mincey v. Ga. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affs.,
708 S.E.2d 644, 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
60. Bradberry, supra note 2, at 575–76; see also The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra
note 4, at 28–29 (explaining that unfathomable technology issues have required updates to procedural
rules).
61. Georgia Civil Practice Act, 1966 Ga. Laws 609 (1966) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1–133
(2015 & Supp. 2020)); Harper v. DeFreitas, 160 S.E.2d 260, 261–62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
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looked to both the FRCP and federal cases as persuasive precedent in
considering the construction of the Act and its provisions.62 Although
the FRCP undergo significant revisions to remain current, the
provisions of the CPA relevant to ESI remain largely untouched. 63
Even so, where no material differences exist between the text of the
FRCP and the CPA, the Supreme Court of Georgia still looks to
federal courts for guidance in interpreting and applying procedural
rules.64
1. Scope of Discovery
Although the twenty-sixth section of the respective procedural
rules addresses the scope of discovery, their methods diverge,
creating vastly different litigative environments.65 Both rules
explicitly allow discovery of nonprivileged matters relevant to the
claim or defense of any party involved in the litigation.66 Moreover,
neither rule requires admissibility within the scope of discovery,
though the Georgia statute retains the “reasonably calculated”
language removed from the federal rule in 2015. 67
62. See, e.g., Ambler v. Archer, 196 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Ga. 1973); Poole v. City of Atlanta, 160
S.E.2d 874, 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Harper, 160 S.E.2d at 262; see also, e.g., Holland v. Sanfax
Corp., 126 S.E.2d 442, 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (explaining that federal cases may serve as persuasive
authority where the state law was substantially identical to a federal rule).
63. See § 9-11-1; H.B. 1017, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016) (which died in committee,
never receiving a floor vote); H.B. 643, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014) (which passed in the
state house but died in the state senate).
64. See, e.g., Chappuis v. Ortho Sport & Spine Physicians Savannah, LLC, 825 S.E.2d 206, 211 (Ga.
2019) (looking to the comparable federal rule and federal courts’ interpretations in addressing a matter
of first impression); Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 807 S.E.2d 444, 447 n.6 (Ga. 2017); Ambler, 196
S.E.2d at 862; Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., v. McGivern, 208 S.E.2d 258, 262 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
65. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26, with § 9-11-26.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); § 9-11-26(b)(1). Georgia Code section 9-11-26(b)(1) states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
§ 9-11-26(b)(1).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); § 9-11-26(b)(1) (“It is not ground for objection that the information
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However, unlike its federal counterpart, the Georgia rule does not
clearly outline a proportionality standard for eDiscovery.68 In its
stagnancy, the CPA fails to establish a balancing test where the
burdens of production might outweigh the benefits, though some
level of proportionality may be inferred from the CPA’s mission to
ensure a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.”69 Though aspects of the CPA imply that the application of a
burden–balancing rule may be within a judge’s discretion, the lack of
reasonableness and proportionality as an overarching discovery
standard suggests Georgia’s resistance to adapting new procedures in
a technology-driven world.70
2. Allocation of Discovery Costs
With regard to the allocation of discovery costs, the federal rules
provide guidelines where the state falls silent.71 The FRCP explicitly
limit production that causes undue burden or expense; however,
Georgia provides no such provision. 72 Rather, courts temper the
liberal scope of discovery primarily by protective order.73 Though,
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.”). The “reasonably calculated” language created problems that
ultimately overtook other limitations on the scope of discovery, leading to its removal. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
68. § 9-11-26.
69. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 (2015 & Supp. 2020); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); The Sedona Conf.,
The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 148–49. Even so, the state rule lacks the expansion language
“and employed by the court and the parties” that Chief Justice Roberts suggests supports the affirmative
duty of cooperation of adverse parties in litigation. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 5–6; see
also The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 5.
70. See AMLI Residential Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008);
Hull v. WTI, Inc., 744 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Hartry, 729 S.E.2d 656,
668 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Bradberry, supra note 2, at 574–75; see also § 9-11-26(b)(1).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); § 9-11-26(b); see also BRENT KIDWELL ET AL., ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY § 2.03 (2019).
72. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (applying specific limitations to the discovery of ESI), with
§ 9-11-26(b) (providing no differentiation between physical and electronic evidence).
73. § 9-11-26(c); Hartry, 729 S.E.2d at 658. But see McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 562 S.E.2d
809, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that a court should not implement protective orders without
first finding bad faith or harassment by the requesting party). Code section 9-11-26(c) states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or, alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the county where the deposition is to be

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/9

16

Daigle: Georgia’s Approach to Proportionality for ESI

2021]

GEORGIA’S APPROACH TO PROPORTIONALITY FOR ESI

619

where the FRCP specify that protective orders may allocate
discovery costs if the burden of production disproportionately affects
the producing party, the state equivalent of the Rule 26(c) order
limits judicial authority to the scope of discovery, leaving the
burdens of cost to the producing party.74
Both federal and state rules provide for the prevailing party to
recover costs associated with litigation to some extent. 75 Absent an
express statutory provision stating otherwise, Georgia leaves cost
assessments to the court’s discretion, reasoning that a trial judge’s
familiarity with the case can best assess a fair allocation of
expenses.76 Similarly, litigation costs may be awarded under the
FRCP, and like in Georgia, this particular award depends on
prevailing in an adversarial proceeding. 77 Note, however, that these
costs differ from those imposed as a judicial sanction.78
3. Means of Production
Georgia’s rules for the form of ESI production provide
uncharacteristically similar standards to the federal rules with only
minor differences.79 Both jurisdictions require production of a
“reasonably usable form” of data that might otherwise require

taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .
§ 9-11-26(c).
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); § 9-11-26(c); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note
4, at 187.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 54; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54 (2015 & Supp. 2020). Georgia Code section 9-11-54(d)
states:
Except where express provision therefor is made in a statute, costs shall be allowed as
a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs
against this state and its officers, agencies, and political subdivisions shall be imposed
only to the extent permitted by the law.
§ 9-11-54(d).
76. § 9-11-54; Nguyen v. Dinh, 608 S.E.2d 211, 212 (Ga. 2005); Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 404
S.E.2d 627, 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (reasoning that a trial judge can best award costs when both parties
prevail on different issues); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Williams, 332 S.E.2d 22, 24 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 54; § 9-11-54(d).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also infra Section II.A.4.
79. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 34, with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34 (2015 & Supp. 2020).
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translation.80 Additionally, both require specific objections with
respect to each item requested. 81 The federal rules specify that parties
need not duplicate evidence, though a failure to meet this provision in
state court would not satisfy the prejudice requirement necessary to
incur sanctions.82 Despite the differences in wording, the rules read
as functionally equivalent.83
4. Failure to Make Discovery and Sanctions
Regardless of jurisdiction, failure to comply with a court’s
discovery order may result in significant, potentially case-dispositive
sanctions.84 The Georgia legislature has yet to create a specific
sub-rule for ESI preservation failures, though the current statute
leaves ample room for judicial discretion in ordering sanctions.85
State courts would benefit from a rule modeled after Rule 37(e) by
receiving stronger guidance surrounding the implementation of
curative measures versus sanctions.86
B. Georgia’s Spoliation Approach
Georgia courts evaluate the spoliation of evidence largely outside
of the procedural statutes of the CPA, turning instead to decades of
case law and rules of evidence. 87 Where spoliation occurs, trial courts

80. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii); § 9-11-34(a)(1).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B); § 9-11-34(b)(2).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii); see also infra Section II.B.1.
83. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 34, with § 9-11-34.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 37; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (“If a party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a party or a person . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just . . . .”).
85. See § 9-11-37. Due to the lack of proportionality standards, a preservation failure related to ESI
would automatically fall into the same category as physical evidence. See id.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see also The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194;
The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 160–61; see also infra Sections
II.B.2, III.A.2.
87. O.C.G.A. § 24-14-22 (2013 & Supp. 2020); Phillips v. Harmon, 774 S.E.2d 596, 603 (Ga. 2015);
Jones v. Krystal Co., 498 S.E.2d 565, 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469
S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
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exercise wide discretion to designate sanctions appropriate to the
facts of the case.88
1. Spoliation Framework
Georgia defines spoliation as “the destruction or failure to preserve
evidence that is necessary to contemplated or pending litigation.”89
Although the state does not recognize spoliation as an actionable tort,
its occurrence within a case may give rise to an unfavorable
presumption, allowing a jury to infer that any missing evidence
would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party, or other
remedies.90 State case law establishes an elemental test for spoliation:
for a party to seek remedies for spoliated evidence, the requesting
party must demonstrate that (1) the spoliating party had notice of
existing or pending litigation; (2) the spoliating party maintained
custodial control over the evidence in question; and (3) the spoliation
resulted in prejudice or harm in the suit. 91
To receive a remedy for spoliation, a party must first show that the
producing party had an obligation to preserve the evidence in
question.92 Georgia’s original test looked for “contemplated or
pending litigation” to trigger the preservation duty. 93 However, in the
88. Wright v. VIF/Valentine Farms Bldg. One, LLC, 708 S.E.2d 41, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
AMLI Residential Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)).
89. Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., 647 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga. 2007) (quoting Bouvé & Mohr, LLC v. Banks,
618 S.E.2d 650, 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)).
90. § 24-14-22; Butler v. Turner, 555 S.E.2d 427, 432 (Ga. 2001) (Carley, J., dissenting) (“Georgia
does not recognize any independent causes of action for damages caused by perjury, spoliation of
evidence, or other fraudulent alteration, destruction, or concealment of evidence in a prior judicial
proceeding.”); Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 363, 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); see also
infra Section II.B.2. Code section 24-14-22 states:
If a party has evidence in such party’s power and within such party’s reach by which
he or she may repel a claim or charge against him or her but omits to produce it or if
such party has more certain and satisfactory evidence in his or her power but relies on
that which is of a weaker and inferior nature, a presumption arises that the charge or
claim against such party is well founded; but this presumption may be rebutted.
§ 24-14-22.
91. Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at 603; Jones, 498 S.E.2d at 569; Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785.
92. Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1, Inc., 748 S.E.2d
281, 287 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)).
93. Silman v. Assocs. Bellemeade, 685 S.E.2d 277, 278 (Ga. 2009) (quoting Bridgestone/Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Campbell Nissan N. Am., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 923, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)); Baxley,
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2015 case Phillips v. Harmon, the Supreme Court of Georgia
expanded the rule, holding that notice of litigation “can be
constructive as well as actual” and providing a five-factor test for
determining the foreseeability of litigation. 94 The test weighs
circumstantial factors to evaluate whether a reasonable person might
anticipate litigation, triggering the duty to preserve before the receipt
of actual notice.95
Courts have yet to clearly establish the extent to which this
preservation duty applies to electronic evidence owned by an entity.96
In Phillips, the court repeatedly referred to “the duty to preserve
relevant evidence” rather than any evidence, implying the existence
of a relevancy factor limiting the scope of the obligation. 97 Even so,
the question of whether or not a court would limit the financial
burdens of preservation to comport with the principles identified by
the Sedona Conference remains unanswered.98
Additionally, spoliation requires a showing that the spoliating
party maintained custody of the evidence. 99 Although courts
recognize that a party must have custody of evidence to be liable for
647 S.E.2d at 30 (quoting Bouvé & Mohr, 618 S.E.2d at 654).
94. 774 S.E.2d at 605. The court in Phillips described the five-factor test as follows:
Notice that the plaintiff is contemplating litigation may also be derived from, i.e.,
litigation may be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant based on, other
circumstances, such as the type and extent of the injury; the extent to which fault for
the injury is clear; the potential financial exposure if faced with a finding of liability;
the relationship and course of conduct between the parties, including past litigation or
threatened litigation; and the frequency with which litigation occurs in similar
circumstances.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 604.
97. Id. (emphasis added); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch, 812 S.E.2d 256, 263 (Ga.
2018); Sheats v. Kroger Co., 805 S.E.2d 121, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at
604); Sachtjen v. State, 798 S.E.2d 114, 116 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at
604).
98. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 95, 187 (“[C]osts and burdens
preserving large amounts of ESI may be disproportionate to the needs of the case, and even the sole
copy of an ESI item need not be preserved if doing so would be disproportionate to the needs of the
case.”).
99. Jones v. Krystal Co., 498 S.E.2d 565, 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (limiting the consequences for
spoliation to those circumstances where the spoliated evidence was within the producing party’s
control).
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its spoliation, they do not limit that control to the producing party
alone but rather extend the definition to include those acting as the
party’s agents.100
However, this approach to control oversimplifies the complexities
of data by presuming a straightforward, bright-line understanding of
the custody of evidence. 101 Because digital evidence exists within
networks and across devices, which are both often accessible by
multiple actors, the court’s method neglects the intricacies of
third-party service providers and their effect on data ownership. 102
Moreover, it raises further questions about the cooperation
requirements of these third parties in both the preservation obligation
and the production of evidence.103
Reasoning that the spoliation of evidence “renders a full defense
impossible,” courts require a finding of prejudice against the
requesting party.104 Because remedies against a spoliating party seek
to level the playing field between parties, a finding that no prejudice
exists precludes remedial measures. 105 In Chapman v. Auto Owners
Insurance Co., the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted a five-factor
test for evaluating the prejudicial effects of spoliated evidence. 106
100. Bouvé & Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 618 S.E.2d 650, 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding evidence that
the spoliating third party acted as an agent of the producing party sufficient to apply sanctions); see also
Boswell v. Overhead Door Corp., 664 S.E.2d 262, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (denying a spoliation
presumption where the movant offered no evidence that the spoliating party acted as the producing
party’s agent).
101. The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Rule 34 & Rule 45, supra note 1, at 479–80; see also
Memorandum from J. David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., to J. Jeffrey
Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 15 (June 14, 2014),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/st09-2014-add_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL6H-PMTD].
102. See The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Rule 34 & Rule 45, supra note 1, at 479–80. Federal
circuits currently disagree on the scope of the obligation regarding third-party ownership, with standards
examining the right to obtain documents, the ability to practically obtain documents absent the legal
right to obtain, and others. Id. at 482.
103. Id. at 573.
104. AMLI Residential Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Campbell Nissan N. Am., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 923,
926 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)).
105. Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 363, 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that
without prejudice, there is no measure of damages to remedy). Here, Georgia remains generally
consistent with the FRCP regarding prejudice and remedial measures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 195.
106. 469 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); see also Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D.
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The Chapman test weighs the following factors: (1) the prejudice
against the defendant, (2) curability of said prejudice, (3) the
evidence’s practical importance in litigation, (4) the good or bad faith
of the producing party, and (5) the potential abuse stemming from
expert testimony.107 The test strongly resembles the Sedona
Conference guidance on the conditions a court should consider when
addressing remedial measures.108 Courts use the Chapman analysis
both in determining the prejudicial effect and evaluating the
necessary sanctions.109
2. Remedies to Spoliation Available in Georgia
Georgia’s spoliation theory aims to remedy the prejudice a party
experiences during litigation where the opposing party interferes
“with the opportunity to win a lawsuit.”110 Where interference
occurs, courts recognize and evaluate the appropriate sanctions. 111
Using the Chapman factor test, courts determine sanctions on a
case-by-case basis, ranging from the unfavorable presumption to
case-altering, exclusionary sanctions. 112
Georgia’s evidentiary rules establish the only statutory remedy for
spoliation.113 The law intended to penalize a party for withholding
evidence within its control or relying on weaker evidence; however,
the Supreme Court of Georgia has limited its application to only the

362, 365 (D. Mass. 1991).
107. Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785. Abuse from expert testimony might occur when the spoliating
party’s expert has already evaluated the evidence. Id. Without the evidence, the requesting party could
not produce their own expert witness to assess the evidence. N. Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281,
284 (D. Me. 1993).
108. Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 194.
109. WellStar Health Sys., Inc. v. Kemp, 751 S.E.2d 445, 453–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); AMLI
Residential Props., 667 S.E.2d at 154; Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, 574 S.E.2d at 926; R.A.
Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 539 S.E.2d 873, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
110. Sharpnack, 499 S.E.2d at 365 (emphasis omitted).
111. R.A. Siegel, 539 S.E.2d at 877 (excluding expert testimony where the producing party’s reckless
disregard of a discovery order amounted to bad faith); Sharpnack, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
112. AMLI Residential Props., 667 S.E.2d at 154 (“Where a party has destroyed or significantly
altered evidence that is material to the litigation, the trial court has wide discretion to fashion sanctions
on a case-by-case basis.”); Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785.
113. O.C.G.A. § 24-14-22 (2013 & Supp. 2020).
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most extreme cases. 114 An unfettered application of the unfavorable
presumption, in essence, disposes of the case against the producing
party.115 A strict interpretation of the statute forgoes the idea that the
spoliated evidence might pose a significant loss to the producing
party, limiting the potential damage from the evidence to the
unconstrained imagination of a jury.116 By requiring an element of
bad faith for an unfavorable presumption, Georgia holds its litigants
to the federal standard.117
Where the presumption would prove insufficient to remedy
spoliation, courts consider exclusionary sanctions or outright
dismissal of the case. 118 When evaluating sanctions other than the
unfavorable presumption, courts revisit Chapman to determine an
appropriate remedy.119 Such sanctions range from the exclusion of
testimony surrounding the evidence to dismissal of the case
entirely.120
The complete disposition of a case typically requires intentional
destruction of evidence to make the opposing presentation of a
defense nearly impossible. 121 Additionally, when seeking summary
judgment as a remedy, courts require a meaningful connection, or

114. Phillips v. Harmon, 774 S.E.2d 596, 606 (Ga. 2015); Fields v. Yellow Cab Co. of Atlanta, 56
S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (decided under former Code section 38-119); Pamela L. Ferrell,
Think Twice Before Filing a Spoliation Motion Against a Plaintiff in Georgia, BUTLER SNOW: PROD.
LINES BLOG (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.butlersnow.com/2018/12think-twice-before-filing-spoliationmotion-against-a-plaintiff-in-georgia/ [https://perma.cc/TB39-FNRA].
115. R.A. Siegel, 539 S.E.2d at 878 (noting that the severity of sanctions is sometimes “the functional
equivalent of striking the answer or dismissal”).
116. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch, 812 S.E.2d 256, 265 (Ga. 2018).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 196–97. But see
AMLI Residential Props., 667 S.E.2d at 155 (noting that exclusionary sanctions may be appropriate even
without bad faith).
118. Lee Wallace, Spoliation of Evidence, 8 GA. BAR J. 12, 14 (2002).
119. Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Wallace, supra
note 118.
120. Wright v. VIF/Valentine Farms Bldg. One, LLC, 708 S.E.2d 41, 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Campbell Nissan N. Am., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 923, 926 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002)); AMLI Residential Props., 667 S.E.2d at 154; R.A. Siegel, 539 S.E.2d at 878.
121. R & R Insulation Servs. v. Royal Indem. Co., 705 S.E.2d 223, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(“Dismissal is usually reserved for cases involving malicious destruction of evidence, which does not
appear to be the case here.”); Giles v. Schwans Home Serv., No. 11EV013280A, 2013 Ga. State LEXIS
1794, at *2 (Ga. State Ct. Mar. 12, 2013).
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causal link, between the spoliated evidence and the underlying
claim.122 Even where spoliation may have obviously occurred,
summary judgment is only appropriate where the destroyed evidence
would otherwise link the claims.123
III. PROPOSAL
To protect the interests of Georgia’s litigants, the laws guiding
discovery must progress to include considerations of big data and its
associated risks. Although the existing framework allows for
proportionality and reasonableness, the lack of explicit safeguards
risks the application of unduly burdensome standards.
A. Conceptual Changes to Georgia’s Discovery Procedure
Updating the rules will not require an overhaul of the CPA; rather,
minor changes to the existing statutory schema can significantly
reshape Georgia’s jurisprudence.124 A contemporary approach to
eDiscovery must embrace proportionality and equitable sanctions to
bring the state into the twenty-first century.125
1. Georgia Must Explicitly State the Role Proportionality Plays
in the Discovery of ESI
The proportionality protections of the FRCP are, at best, implied in
state discovery rules. 126 Moreover, the scant protections of Georgia

122. Wilson v. Mountain Valley Cmty. Bank, 759 S.E.2d 921, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Craig v.
Bailey Bros. Realty, 697 S.E.2d 888, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), disapproved of by Phillips v. Harmon,
774 S.E.2d 596, 606 (Ga. 2015); Hardeman v. Spires, 492 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997),
vacated, 496 S.E.2d 895 (Ga.), remanded to 503 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Compare Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., 647 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga. 2007) (where cameras would have
shown the defendant was driving), with Craig, 697 S.E.2d at 891 (where the spoliated evidence, had it
been produced, would not link the plaintiff’s claims to the defendant’s conduct as to overcome summary
judgment).
124. See infra Section III.B.1.
125. See The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 147–49.
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 37; O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-26, -37 (2015 & Supp. 2020); see also supra Section
II.A.
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law rely on an aging judiciary to understand the implications of new
technologies and apply them to a field they may no longer
recognize.127 The lack of emphasis in state rules risks the very
misapplications that the drafters of the FRCP sought to eliminate. 128
To prevent the reincarnation of issues previously resolved by the
federal system, the state must adapt old-school discovery practices to
embrace the digitalization of our new reality. 129
Proportionality must govern the scope of a party’s preservation
obligation.130 By balancing the costs of digital preservation with the
uniqueness of the information, courts may determine whether a party
can reasonably be bound by the duty to preserve. 131 Further, a party’s
discovery requests must be proportionate to the specific needs of the
case.132 The financial burdens must be weighed against the requesting
party’s interests of informational access, the availability of other
pertinent resources, and the importance of discovery in resolving the
issues of the case. 133 Finally, a party’s action or inaction should be
considered by the court because it can impact the efficiency, cost,
and timeliness of litigation.134

127. See J. Ralph Artigliere, A State Court Judge’s View on E-Discovery (Part One), E-DISCOVERY
TEAM: L. & TECH., https://e-discoveryteam.com/2010/11/08/a-state-court-judges-view-on-e-discoverypart-one [https://perma.cc/A3TP-ZZLP]. In 2017, the average age of an Article III judge was
sixty-eight, and the average age at initial appointment was fifty. Demography of Article III Judges,
1789–2017,
FED. JUD.
CTR.
[hereinafter
Demography
of
Article
III
Judges],
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges
[https://perma.cc/K325-4HB8]. The same year, the average age of newly appointed or elected judges in
Georgia was forty-nine. Honorable P. Harris Hines, Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of Ga., 2017 State of the
Judiciary Address (Jan. 25, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.gasupreme.us/2017-state-of-judiciaryaddress/ [https://perma.cc/ZL37-A5EU]. It follows that the average judge was already presiding in the
early 2000s when ESI became a relevant topic of conversation. See Demography of Article III Judges,
supra.
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
129. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
130. The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 150.
131. Id. at 150–53.
132. Id. at 157–59.
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 168.
134. The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 159.
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2. Georgia Should Adopt the Two-Tiered Approach to Sanctions
Established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)
The strength of Rule 37(e) rests in the distinction between
accidental and intentional loss of information. 135 The rule applies a
commonsense approach that mitigates accidental loss while
intentionally punishing bad faith. 136 In issuing sanctions for the
spoliation of ESI, Georgia courts should employ a similar division.
With one exception, the Chapman framework for evaluating
prejudice offers an ideal starting point for evaluating sanctions under
a divided scheme. 137 Because this analysis seeks only to cure
prejudice, however, the producing party’s good or bad faith should be
removed from consideration. 138 A thorough, fact-specific Chapman
analysis paints a clear picture of the prejudice a party experienced
while also identifying the means necessary to ameliorate the
findings.139
When considering punitive sanctions, courts must employ an
independent analysis, first determining the existence of bad faith and
then identifying the appropriate action. 140 Where prejudicial remedies
seek to level an uneven playing field, sanctions for intentional

135. FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also Alison Grounds & Scott Wandstrat, E-Discovery Bill Is Bad Policy
but Will Keep Us Busy, Experts Write, LAW.COM: DAILY REP. (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202750159861/ediscovery-bill-is-bad-policy-but-willkeep-us-busy-experts-write/?slreturn=20200901183820; Leslie J. Bryan, E-Discovery Bill Addresses
Complexity Between General Georgia Courts and Limited Federal Courts, State Bar of Georgia’s Task
Force
Chair
Writes,
LAW.COM:
DAILY
REP.
(Feb.
22,
2016,
11:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202750274069/ediscovery-bill-addresses-complexitybetween-general-georgia-courts-and-limited-federal-courts-state-bar-of-georgias-task-force-chairwrites/.
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
137. Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); see supra Section
II.B.2.
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at
785. The producing party’s good or bad faith will still play a critical role in later sanction analysis. See
infra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
139. WellStar Health Sys. v. Kemp, 751 S.E.2d 445, 453–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); AMLI Residential
Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am.
Tire, LLC v. Campbell Nissan N. Am., Inc., 274 S.E.2d 923, 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); R.A. Siegel Co.
v. Bowen, 539 S.E.2d 873, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785.
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spoliation intend to punish parties who act in bad faith. 141 The
severity of the measures authorized by the court should reflect the
culpability of the producing party. 142 Further, the adverse
presumption available under Georgia’s evidentiary guidelines should
only be applied under this test after a finding of intent.143
B. Implementing Changes to Georgia Law
With those considerations in mind, the question shifts to how
Georgia might make such changes. The majority of states have
modernized discovery procedures by enacting statutes, while others
have seen reform through the highest courts of the state. 144 How the
state accomplishes these changes makes little difference, so long as
steps are taken to effectuate procedural change.
1. Legislation to Modernize the Civil Practice Act
Though legislative action is the most direct way to update the rules
of the CPA, such change requires lawmakers to reach a consensus on
the best method to codify procedures governing ESI.145 The most
recent attempt to rewrite the law demonstrates the extreme
differences of opinion that have kept the State of Georgia in the
Typewriter Age.146
In 2016, Georgia House Bill 1017 (H.B. 1017) presented the state
with its most recent opportunity to revamp discovery procedure but
ultimately never left the state’s house floor.147 The bill’s deviation
141. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193–96. Because this test seeks to
prevent culpable action by the producing party, the prejudice experienced by the requesting party is
entirely irrelevant and should not play a part in the consideration. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 195.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 196.
143. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193–96.
144. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 7.15 (4th ed. 2019).
145. H.B. 1017, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016). On multiple occasions, Georgia has tried
to update the CPA to encompass eDiscovery and failed to pass legislation. Id.; H.B. 643, 151st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014).
146. See Ga. H.B. 1017.
147. Id.
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from the federal rules sparked controversy, pitting plaintiffs attorneys
against those defending larger corporations with higher volumes of
data.148 Under the guise of proportionality, the bill required
additional steps by the producing party to receive protection from
overly burdensome discovery requests.149 Additionally, by modifying
a few key phrases, the bill restructured Rule 37’s two-tiered
sanctioning guidelines, eliminating the intent requirement necessary
for an adverse jury instruction or other case-altering penalties.150 By
declining to pass H.B. 1017, the Georgia House of Representatives
prevented the implementation of legislation that would have
otherwise undermined the principles and guidance provided by Rule
37—specifically, the spirit of cooperation and the standards of
fairness and proportionality—that Georgia needs to modernize
discovery.151
Effective compromise necessary to pass new legislation
necessitates a paradigm shift that considers both sides as requesting
and producing parties, each of whom may reasonably expect
protection from the court. 152 Lawmakers must reconsider the
“us-versus-them” narrative guiding debates, instead balancing the
benefits received by a requesting party with the burdens attributed to
the producing party.153 A solution should seek to produce a fair

148. See Grounds & Wandstrat, supra note 135; Bryan, supra note 135.
149. Ga. H.B. 1017; Grounds & Wandstrat, supra note 135; Bryan, supra note 135. By moving the
proportionality language to part (c), the bill required a producing party to obtain a protective order to
limit the requesting party’s access to information. Ga. H.B. 1017. Though the factors match the
corresponding federal rule exactly, the implementation has the opposite effect that creates burdens rather
than limiting them. FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Ga. H.B. 1017; The Sedona Conf., Commentary on
Proportionality, supra note 14, at 154.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Ga. H.B. 1017; Grounds & Wandstrat, supra note 135. Where the FRCP
specifically differentiate between sanctions to cure prejudice and those to punish intentional deprivation
of evidence, the proposed bill combined them into an amalgam of sanctionable conduct that provided no
guidance for judicial implementation. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e), with Ga. H.B. 1017. The
attempted revision mistook two independent factors, intent to deprive evidence and prejudice to the
producing party, as the two ends of the spoliation spectrum, proposing a broad, discretionary middle
ground that undermined any guidance within the rule. Bryan, supra note 135.
151. Ga. H.B. 1017; The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 155–56.
152. See Grounds & Wandstrat, supra note 135.
153. Id.; see also Bryan, supra note 135.
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outcome for both parties rather than a favorable one for only one
party.154
2. Promulgation of Uniform Rules by the Supreme Court of
Georgia
In light of the legislature’s inability to pass legislation updating the
CPA, Georgia should follow the example of at least thirteen other
states that have exacted change by order of their respective state’s
highest court.155 Such an order could take one of two forms: a
proposed amendment to the CPA or the implementation of a uniform
rule.156 A proposed amendment requires ratification by the Georgia
General Assembly, perpetuating the cycle that has prevented change
thus far.157
The Supreme Court of Georgia’s constitutional authority allows
for the establishment of uniform court rules providing for efficient,
low-cost dispute resolution; however, such rules must comport with
the existing statutes comprising the CPA.158 Since 2015, the court has
already used this approach to bridge the gap between the federal and
state variations on Rule 26. 159 Likewise, the court should consider a
similar bridge to Rules 26(b) and 37. 160 Such a change could

154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Grounds & Wandstrat,
supra note 135.
155. See
generally
Order
(Ala.
Nov.
4,
2009),
https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/rules/Rules%2016263334374551A%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2M8-E3LP]; In re Various Ariz. Rules of Civ. Proc., No. R-17-0010, 2017 Ariz.
LEXIS 340 (Aug. 31, 2017); Letter from Rachelle M. Resnick, Clerk, Ariz. Sup. Ct., to Georgia L. Paul
et al. (Sept. 6, 2007) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review); In re: Electronic
Discovery and Proposed Ark. R. Civ. P. 26.1, No. 08-923 (Ark. Mar. 5, 2009); In re Amendment of
Rules 4009.1, 4009.11, 4009.12, 4009.21, 4009.23, & 4011 of the Pa. Rules of Civ. Proc., No. 564 (Pa.
2012); In re Super. Ct. Rules of Civ. Proc., 2017 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. Nov. 6, 2017); In re Petition to
Amend Selected Provisions of Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 8, 2016, No. 2016-01382, Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn.
Aug. 18, 2016); see also ARKFELD, supra note 144.
156. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 1; O.C.G.A. § 15-2-18 (2020).
157. § 15-2-18.
158. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 1; Edwards v. State, 636 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ga. 2006) (holding that
the supreme court may not implement rules that would otherwise abrogate existing statutes).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); § 15-2-18; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 5.4.
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), 37.
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transform the landscape of civil discovery and also further the goals
of uniformity and fairness that support the state’s judicial system.161
This Note proposes, as an example, the following addendum to
Rule 5 of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts of the State of
Georgia:162
Rule 5.6. Proportionality in Electronic Discovery
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.163
On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order,
the party from whom discovery is sought must show that
the information is not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost.164 In weighing the burden on the
producing party against the benefit to the requesting party,
the court shall consider:
1) Whether the burden on the producing party results
from the party’s prior action or inaction;165
2) The financial burdens incurred in the production of
the evidence;166 and
3) Nonmonetary factors including, but not limited to:
(1) the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
(2) the amount in controversy, (3) the parties’
relative access to relevant information, (4) the
161. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 1; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 1.
162. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 5. Rule 5, “Discovery in Civil Actions,” currently ends with Rule 5.5,
“Privilege.” Id. The proposed Rule includes additions to the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts of the
State of Georgia that do not currently exist in Georgia’s civil procedure. Id.
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). This line directly establishes the proportionality standard of Rule 26.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 56–69. See
generally The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14.
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
165. The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at 159.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14,
at 167–68.
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parties’ resources, and (5) the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.167
The proposed change begins by explicitly defining a
proportionality standard that invokes the language of the federal
rules.168 In combining the structure of the federal rules with the
standards promulgated by the Sedona Conference, the proposed Rule
establishes factors to guide the court through an evidentiary cost–
benefit analysis that balances the burdens of production with the
importance of the evidence. 169
Additionally, this Note proposes a second addendum to Rule 5 of
the Uniform Rules:
Rule 5.7. Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored
Information
Upon receiving actual or constructive notice of pending
litigation, a party must take reasonable steps to preserve
electronic evidence.170 Where the court finds that a party
failed to make reasonable preservation efforts:
1) If the loss of the information results in prejudice
against the requesting party, the court may order
curative measures that do not exceed the suffered
prejudice;171 or
2) If the producing party intentionally deprived the
requesting party of the information’s use in litigation,

167. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14, at
168–69; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 65–71.
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); The Sedona Conf., Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 14,
at 159, 167–69; The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 65–71.
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Phillips v. Harmon, 774 S.E.2d 596, 605 (Ga. 2015). This applies the
proportionality requirements to the existing state case law for triggering the preservation obligation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at 605.
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193–97.
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the court may impose sanctions consistent with
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b).172
This additional change builds on existing aspects of case law and
also maintains reasonableness standards that distinguish physical and
electronic evidence. 173 From there, it establishes a distinction
between curative measures addressing prejudice and punitive judicial
action otherwise absent in Georgia’s jurisprudence.174
CONCLUSION
New advances in technology have revolutionized society, requiring
the rapid implementation of a new legal framework. 175 As technology
continues to shape the course of human interaction, society demands
a method to use these developments to settle inevitable conflict.176
Though most other states have, through the legislative process or by
order of the state’s highest court, adapted the discovery process to
reflect current technology, Georgia remains one of the few
holdouts.177
As it stands, the CPA does not differentiate between the
mechanisms for discovering physical and electronic evidence. 178
Current state discovery guidelines rely on the judicial application of
implied proportionality standards. 179 With a full generation between
new lawyers and freshly-appointed judges, the informational gap
between attorneys and the bench challenges the court to officiate a

172. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b) (2015 & Supp. 2020); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The
Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at 193–97.
173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Phillips, 774 S.E.2d at 605.
174. § 9-11-37(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Principles, supra note 4, at
193–97; see also supra Section II.B.2.
175. See Schafer & Mason, supra note 6, at 18–35.
176. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE
§ 1.1 (2016 ed.).
177. See cases cited supra note 155; see also ARKFELD, supra note 144.
178. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-26, -34, -37, -54 (2015 & Supp. 2020); Bradberry, supra note 2.
179. See supra Section II.A.
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game under outdated rules where the objective has evolved. 180 The
rules of discovery lack the explicit standards of proportionality and
fairness needed to protect the interests of Georgia litigants.181
To modernize the CPA, Georgia must first explicitly state the role
of proportionality in discovery, particularly in reference to ESI and
metadata. Further, the state must incorporate sanctioning guidelines
that mitigate the prejudice of unintentional loss and impose penalties
only upon a finding of bad faith. Though these changes would by no
means solve every eDiscovery problem, they represent a decision by
the state to take steps towards the future.

180. Honorable Hines, supra note 127; Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 127.
181. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26, and FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e), with § 9-11-26, and § 9-11-37.
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